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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At hearings prior to trial, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist 
denied appellant's motions asking that Utah decline jurisdiction 
or abate proceedings in favor of concurrent proceedings in New 
York State. 
On February 17, 1978, Judge Hyde entered a Decree of Divorce 
between the parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
1. Judge Hyde's Decree of Divorce should be modified so as 
to incorporate the parties' previously executed Agreement of 
Separation in its entirety. 
2. Appellant should be released from a Utah imposed order 
staying her from concurrent proceedings in New York State so that 
in the future, she may proceed there to enforce or modify the Utah 
decree if neither party then resides in Utah. 
3. Prays for fees and costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Both parties were born and raised in Brooklyn, New York. 
In 1962, plaintiff-respondent, graduated from college, re-
ceived a commission in the United States Air Force and married 
appellant-defendant. The parties are in their mid-thirties. 
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Major Rost remained in the Air Force. Mrs. Rost and ~e 
parties' two children have accompanied him when possible. Since 
May, 1975, the parties have been separated with Mrs. Rost and t:1, 
children residing in the home state of New York. 
The children are John Kenneth Rost, born January 24, 1964, 
and Suzanne Louise Rost, born November 17, 1966. 
In June, 1976, Major Rost, while enroute to a new assignme: 
at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, went home to New York. The partie: 
discussed their marital problems and decided to attempt reconcil: 
tion by Mrs. Rost going with Major Rost to Utah for the summer, 
and the children to follow in the fall if the reconciliation wor: 
They made an al terna ti ve arrangement, an Agreement of Sep2: 
tion pursuant to the laws of New York State in the event that re: 
ciliation failed. 
This Agreement of Separation is attached as Annex 1. ~~ 
requests the court read it. It has many terms, such as precisel 
defining emancipating events (Annex 1, P 12-15), notice and con· 
sent on children's health treatment, etc., that are beneficial'.' 
both the parties and desirable in defining the privileges and~ 
of each party in event of separation or divorce. 
In preparation for execution of the agreement, both parfr 
saw an attorney, Marvin Malin, several times. In his Findings : 
Fact, Judge Hyde specifically found: 
"The Court finds such an Agreement of Separation to be . 
reasonable, to have been properly executed without, dure5'' 
and incorporates it herein except that the Court finds . 
its provisions of alimony and child support to be inequi~· 
ably high and modifies such provisions as hereinafter se 
forth, and eliminates life insurance." 
-2-
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By the terms of the Agreement, the parties split the then 
existing debts evenly. 
They also split their existing personal property (there being 
no real property) evenly (Annex 1, P 24,25), except that, Major 
Rost getting more than Mrs. Rost, agreed to pay her $1,200 to 
make the distribution equal. (Annex 1, P 16, §16c) The last two 
pages of the Agreement of Separation are a specific itemization 
of the parties' property. 
In preparatory work on the Agreement, Major Rost spent many 
hours working out depreciation schedules to arrive at the valua-
tions. (T 274, L 7-12; T 298, L 29 - T 299, L 7; T 300, L 2-8; T311, 
L 4-11; T 331, L 12-17; T 338, L 30-39, L 2) 
He borrowe~ the $1,200 and paid it to Mrs. Rost as part of 
execution of the agreement. This gave Major Rost obligations or 
fixed debts at the time of separation of $4,200. (T 305, L 8 - 306,L3) 
At that time, Mrs. Rost was a college student. She had then, 
and at the time of the divorce, part time work giving her $50 per 
week. 
Major Rest's monthly income at that time was < gross of 
$2,169.01. (Ex P-2) From this, he had tax deductions of $397.85, 
FICA of $93.56 (for 9 months only), and service life insurance of 
$3.40, and voluntary deductions of a U. S. Savings Bond at $37.50, 
charity at $8 and payment on a bank loan at $70, for a net pay of 
$1,558.68 per month, or $1,674.18 with the voluntary deductions 
excluded. 
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Each party paid one-half of the $750 attorney fee charged. 
preparing the Agreement of Separation. 
The attorney, Mr. Malin, indicated that he represented Mrs. 
Rost. Major Rost chose not to have an attorney because of his 
involvement in the terms, and his feeling that being an officer. 
a college graduate, he did not need one. (T 331, L 30 - T 332, L 
He stated in the agreement that he "refused" legal representatic 
(Annex 1, P 17, §18a) 
The Agreement provided that Maj or Rost pay Mrs. Rost $950 :· 
month total. This was $350 per month as support for Mrs. Rost 
(Annex l, P 11) and child support in the amount of $ 3 O 0 per rnont 
per child. (Annex 1, P 12-15, §11) 
After paying the $950 to his wife and two children, he hai 
left $724.18 per month. As his actual taxes for 1976 came to 
$180 per month (T 295, L 20-22) , and he received all the refund 
pursuant to the Agreement (Annex 1, P 15, §13a), adding $217 .85 
to his monthly net ($397. 85 tax deduction less $180 actual tax), 
he had an effective take home after all deductions and support c 
$942.03. 
In essence then, the Agreement split his income equally, 
as it did assets and debts. Granted, Mrs. Rost earned $200 ~r 
month on her own, she also had three people to provide for, and 
tuition to pay. School was expensive. (See Ex D-8) 
In addition, each year in October, it had been his experier, 
to get a federal employee pay raise. He also obtained raises 
through promotion and automatic raises for tenure in the Air Fe 
-4-
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In sum, the Agreement evenly divided the parties' debts, 
evenly divided their assets, and income. 
After signing the Agreement, the couple drove to Utah but 
after several days, the reconciliation failed. 
As Major Rost put it, 
" ... My wife accompanied me out here to Utah after the 
separation agreement was signed, and attempted to have 
a reconciliation. And she found she would like to live 
out here. But shortly after arriving here, it was ob-
vious that it was not going to work, so I sent her back 
home." (T 206, L 20-24) 
By coming to Utah with Major Rost, in reliance on the Agree-
ment, Mrs. Rost acted adversely to her own legal position in the 
event that the parties did divorce. 
This was anticipated as a real probability in the Agreement. 
It provided that either party could file for divorce in any state 
provided that such party would read the Agreement into the record 
and have it be part of the Decree. (Annex 1, P 20-21) 
Mrs. Rost's position change was that, should Major Rost seek 
divorce in another state and ignore the Agreement, she had given 
up jurisdiction in New York when she could have had him served 
there in June, 1976. Such eventuality came to pass. 
From the end of their reconciliation effort, the parties 
lived separately. Each honored the Agreement. 
Mrs. Rost paid off the debts that she had assumed pursuant 
to the agreement. on his part, Major Rost increased his then in-
debtedness of $4,200, by taking an apartment in Ogden across the 
mouth of Weber canyon from Hill Air Force Base, and borrowing 
$2,000 to furnish it (T 306, L 5-16), for a total indebtedness 
-5-
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of $6,200 in summer, 1976. 
At time of trial, November, 1977, he had reduced this $6,, 
indebtedness to $5,400. (T 303, L 21029; T 304, L 22-25; T 30~ 
L 8 - T 306, L 3) 
At time of trial, Major Rost' s gross pay had increased by 
$135.92. (Ex P-2, P-5) 
At time of trial, Mrs. Rost' s circumstances had not chanc, 
favorably. Her part-time income was the same. She was $7 ,000. 
debt. These debts were incurred after the Agreement. They inc. 
ed loans of tuition money, loans for her to paint and fix up fa 
apartment she had taken after the reconciliation failed, but we: 
mostly for attorney fees and travel expense in connection with: 
divorce litigation. 
Major Rost filed for divorce in Utah in April, 1977, but 
Mrs. Rost was not served until June, 1977. She responded by ir. 
ately filing a complaint for divorce in New York, in which she 
asked for divorce pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. 
She was forced to file in New York because Major Rost,~ 
his Utah complaint stated, 
"7. That the parties entered into an Agreement of Separa~ 
tion dated the 15th day of June, 1976, and that plaintifr 
now rescinds that agreement." (T 2) 
Mrs. Ros ts' New York Counsel located counsel in Utah who 
filed a Special Appearance in the Weber County Court asking ~r 
the court "decline" jurisdiction due to the New York oriented 
-6-
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terms of the separation agreement and the facts that spouse, chil-
dren and parties' basic home was in New York. 
This Special Appearance was denied by Judge Wahlquist at an 
ex parte hearing where Major Rost appeared and testified, but no 
notice was given to Mrs. Rost or her counsel. (T 41) 
On receiving notice that her Special Appearance had been denied, 
Mrs. Rost filed an Answer and Counterclaim, and also filed a broader 
motion in regard to appropriate jurisdiction, requesting that Utah 
proceedings be "abated" in favor of New York proceedings. (T 44, 45) 
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Mrs. Rost sent the 
children to Utah to visit Major Rost in August, 1977. On receiving 
them, he took them on a vacation to Jackson, Wyoming, and then asked 
for their custody saying that they wished to remain with him per-
manently. The children stayed with him voluntarily for a while, 
but the 10 year old daughter returned to New York after two weeks 
and the 13 year old boy, in two months. 
Although Major Rost had filed no reply to the Answer and 
Counterclaim, and the Plea in Abatement had not been heard, so 
that there was no determination as to which state should try the 
case and hence no discovery had been attempted in either state, 
Mrs. Rost was advised on August 29, 1977, that the case was set 
for trial on the merits on September 7, 1977. 
By courtesy of Major Rost's counsel, Mrs. Rost's counsel 
was allowed to file a pleading (T 48, 49), asking for ruling on 
the issue of abatement, and for time to prepare for trial should 
the case proceed in Utah. 
-7-
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At hearing of this motion on August 31, 1977, Judge Wahl~. 
(1) denied her Plea for Abatement; (2) allowed Major Rost to cla_ 
custody, something he had previously conceded; ( 3) confirmed the 
trial setting for September 7, 19 7 7; ( 4) compelled Mrs. Rost to 
go to trial on that date, or the first open date thereafter, ~ 
terminating entirely the Major's support obligation as of triai 
date (This was not before the court, but was sua sponte); and 
(5) denied Mrs. Rost any travel fees or attorney fees to enable 
her to appear and defend in Utah. (T 7 4, 75) 
At that hearing, Judge Wahlquist did allow discovery. As 
there were only three court days intervening before trial, it we. 
be difficult to set, take, transcribe and deliver testimony ~r 
form in that time. 
Mrs. Rost was not present at the August 31, 1977, heari~, 
it having come on so suddenly. Her counsel did argue to Judge 
Wahlquist that if custody were an issue, there were no witnessE 
in the State of Utah who could give useful information so that: 
court could make an advised decision. Included among such witn: 
would be the three psychiatrists who had treated the childrenc 
Mrs. Rost during their separation from Major Rost. 
Subsequently, at trial, a letter from each of these psycf.. 
trists was admitted in evidence, subject to Major Rest's right: 
rebut. (T 270, L 25 - T 271, L 7; letters in transcript betwee: 
pages 80 and 81) 
-8-
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The importance of these letters in advising the court on 
custody, can be shown in Judge Hyde's ultimate ruling that Mrs. 
Rost, not the Major, was entitled to the divorce because of his 
"unfeeling" treatment of his family. (T 145, L 23-27) As an 
example, the letter of the daughter's psychiatrist had pointed 
out that she suffered severely, in part because she "tried to 
idealize" her father as being "nice and kind" but in actuality 
couldn't think of any specific times when he ever had been. 
(Letter of Dr. Steven L. Zaslow, T 80-81) 
Never having met her Utah counsel, being entirely unprepared 
for trial, particularly with custody an issue, and feeling that New 
York was the better state to try to the case, Mrs. Rost filed a 
petition for interlocutory appeal and for mandate staying Utah 
proceedings. The petition is attached in full as Annex 2. The 
factual details are not recited here to save space, but the court 
is respectfully requested to read it. It is the foundation for 
Mrs. Rest's argument, Point II. 
The case came on for trial before Judge Ronald 0. Hyde, 
September 7, 1977. On seeing that Mrs. Rost was not prepared 
for trial, the interlocutory appeal's petition for writ of mandamus 
having been denied, but the court and parties not being advised 
as to disposition of the petition itself, and it appearing to 
Judge Hyde that Judge Wahlquist had been attempting to "push the 
matter to early hearing" (T 226, L 14-19), Judge Hyde continued 
trial until the next day. 
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Judge Hyde also stated that the trial would have to proce: 
forthwith as he couldn't overrule a brother judge (T 223, L 1-J; 
T 231, L 12-15; T 236, L 30 - T 237, L 9), even though he frank; 
stated that he disagreed with Judge Wahlquist. (T 252, L 8-14) 
On the following day, September 8, 1977, Mrs. Rost propos, 
that she agree to stay all proceedings in New York until and if 
she were allowed to proceed by a Utah court, provided she could 
allowed a continuance in which to prepare for trial in Utah, anc 
to find if the Utah Supreme Court would hear her Interlocutory 
Appeal and allow trial in New York. 
This offer by Mrs. Rost was voluntary in the sense that sr. 
proposed it, but involuntary in the sense that she was forced b; 
circumstances. There was no other way that the issue of which 
state should try the case could be preserved before trial in Ut:: 
and no other way she could proceed to trial in Utah on a prepare 
basis except by gaining time in which to obtain and present enb 
concerning the children's best interests in custody. 
Judge Hyde accepted her offer. Her consent to stay of pre· 
ceedings in New York was filed in Utah and New York. (T 73, 1:. 
143) 
The Utah Supreme Court denied Mrs. Rost' s Pe ti ti on for In: 
locutory Appeal without hearing, and the case came on for trial 
before Judge Hyde on the merits on November 23, 1977. 
Judge Hyde incorporated the Agreement of Separation into t 
Decree in regard to its allocation of assets and obligations, be 
modified it to eliminate life insurance, reduced the alimonY bY 
-10-
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allowing it to continue to run at $350 per month but only until 
August, 1978, at which time it reduced to $200 per month for 2 1/2 
years, and then terminate. (T 148, L 1-6) 
He based the alimonys:hedule on Mrs. Rost's time schedule to 
complete college. (T 145, L 28 - 146, L 4) 
He also reduced child support from the $300 per child per 
month provided in the Agreement to $200 per child per month, such 
to increase to $225 per month per child on alimony terminating. 
(T 148, L 7-15) 
He made changes because he found the Agreement at time of 
trial to be "inequitable" on these terms. (T 100-101; Tl46, L5-12) 
Judge Hyde found Major Rost's debts to be a total of $5,400.69 
(T 146, L 13-22), and his monthly budget, as submitted by the Major, 
at $1,451. He found "this figure to be essentially realistic al-
though somewhat high... " (T 147, L 6-20) 
In regard to Mrs. Rost, he found her monthly cost of living 
to be $1,342.75 (T 147, L 21-32), and such to be entirely necessary. 
(Ex D-1, D-3, D-6, D-7, D-8, D-9) He found her obligations from 
the separation agreement to have been entirely met by her, but 
that she had incurred other debts totaling $7,124,07. (T 146, 
L 23-31, Ex D-7) 
Judge Hyde required each party to pay their separate obli-
gations. 
Major Rost had outlined his obligations, income and budget 
in Ex P-1, a 3 page handwritten document. This was prepared and 
submitted at the September 7, 1977, hearing when Major Rost 
-11-
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anticipated that his son who was with him then might remain with 
him. 
That exhibit was based on his then gross pay of $2,169.0;, 
per month (Ex P-2), and was verbally amended at trial to increas, 
to $2,304.93. (Ex P-5) 
Judge Hyde found that each party needed $1, 400 a month to 
live on, but there wasn't $2,800 net. For this reason, he cutt 
alimony and child support. That finding, though, was based on: 
Major's circumstances at time of trial including $404. 97 a mont~ 
payable on debts. 
Mrs. Rost contends that analysis of his finances is necess, 
Major Rost had not only lived with the Agreement from June 
1976, to August, 1977, but during that time he reduced his in-
debtedness by $800. He could have lived at base officers quarte: 
at Hill Air Force Base if he had chosen to. Instead he took a 
$2, 000 loan to furnish his new apartment in Ogden. Because he d: 
not choose to economize until he had reduced his debts, he was s. 
stantially overburdened at the time of trial with many short ter: 
debts including over $2, 000 on a number of charge accounts, wh1c: 
is why his monthly payment on debts exceeded $400. 
By comparison, Mrs. Rost was living very frugally. Her ex· 
penses were high due to school tuition, the substantial medical 
expenses of the children to which she had to contribute, and cos. 
of living in New York. •h' Exhibit P-1 is her comparison between '· 
apartment she and the children live in and the apartment Major 
-12-
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Rost lives in. 
line. 
It shows newer and better items for him down the 
Her food for 3 people in New York is $300 per month (Ex D-6), 
while his is only $50 less (Ex 1-P, page 3). Her total clothing 
is $82.80 including two growing children, while he has $70 a month 
for new clothes plus $30 to clean them. 
Included in the Major's style of living, according to his 
exhibit (Ex P 1, page 3) were the following: housing, $300 per month 
in a two bedroom apartment, with utilities at $95 more (her utili-
ties total $54.33), gasoline at $75 per month; food at $250 per 
month; a new car at $160 per month; a savings bond at $37.50 per 
month; school lunches (his son had returned to the mother a month 
prior) at $22 per month. 
His debts are included in his cost of living, although some 
of them, such as Mastercharge (717.25 total, $99.75 per month), 
American Express ($523.64 total, 70.22 per month), and Bank Ameri-
card ($415.05 total, $20 per month), must duplicate, be payment for, 
his monthly expenses such as food and clothing. 
By contrast, while Mrs. Rost has to pay her debts also, she 
omitted them from her list of monthly expenses. 
Had he chosen to live on post, and then been moderately con-
servative about clothing, new car, gasoline, food and charge 
account interest charges, he could easily have lived on a budget 
of $900 per month until he had retired his short term debt. 
The amount of taxes to be withheld from Major Rost's gross 
pay was a point of contest. While stationed in Texas, he had taken 
-13-
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that as his state of permanent residence for tax purposes, Tex~ 
having no income tax. (T 294, L 4-13) 
In the year prior to the divorce hearing, 1976, the family' 
federal tax had averaged $180 per month as previously set out. 
Major Rost estimated his monthly taxes at $450 for 1977. (T 295, 
L 28 -T 299, L 17). The Agreement gave him the right to the tax 
refunds in 1977 as it had in 1976. (Annex 1, P 15, §13a) Exhib. 
P-5 shows an actual monthly withholding of $433.60 for federal 
taxes for him. 
While he lost exemptions for wife and one child by divorce 
and would file a separate return after 19 77, still he would gair. 
an alimony deduction which would substantially offset his losses 
$250 a month, or $3, 000 a year, seems more realistic as his fede: 
tax figure for 1977 and future years. 
Putting these figures together, his total necessary deduc· 
tions from his monthly pay check would be $327.92 ($74.52 FICA, 
$3.40 service life, $250 federal income tax), giving him a take· 
home pay of $1,977.01 per month. 
Deducting $950 a month as per the Agreement, would leave i .. 
a take-home pay of $1,027.01 per month and his family $1,lSOwhi 
Mrs. Rest's earnings are included. 
Having him pay, as Judge Hyde ordered, $750 per month, ga·. 
the wife and two children a total of $950, and gave the Major a 
take home of $1,227.01 per month. 
While Judge Hyde found it would be "inequitable" to have 
Major Rost pay over $750 per month, it is questioned whether 
-14-
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this is because of basic economic disparity, or whether it only 
appears inequitable because of his high monthly debt payments and 
living style. 
Mrs. Rost concedes that Major Rost should not have to live 
stingily. 
Neither should his children. 
Their budget is more rigid than his. 
The factual question rises as to whether avoiding "inequity" 
to Major Rost was not productive of causing "inequity" to his 
family. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IT IS SUBMITTED THAT THE CRITERIA USED IN 
NEW YORK JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A SEPARATION 
OR DIVORCE AGREEMENT ARE APPROPRIATE FOR 
USE IN UTAH IN GENERAL, AND FOR THIS CASE 
IN PARTICULAR. 
The parties' Agreement of Separation was carefully considered, 
well drafted, and Judge Hyde found it to have been willingly and 
intelligently executed. 
While Judge Hyde found that the Agreement's monthly payment 
terms were "inequitable" at time of trial, there is no such find-
ing in his Findings of Fact in regard to the equities at the time 
of the execution of the Agreement. Judge Hyde candidly stated the 
issue in his Memorandum Opinion: 
-15-
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"The State of New York recognizes a no-fault grounds of 
divorce based upon a separation agreement and living apar 
for a period of one year. This is not grounds for diwn 
within this jurisdiction. The courts of New York are not 
blindly bound by such agreements. The courts of this 
state are not bound by stipulation until approved. I 
intend to use the separation agreement basically as a 
stipulation and settlement of the parties' rights subject 
to such changes as I feel justified in equity." (T 100) 
It is submitted that this case illuminates the difficult)' 
in applying simple equitable principles in review of a separat: 
agreement, even though the Utah courts are specifically empower-
to do equity pursuant to 30-3-5, UCA. 
There is an apparent conflict between Utah and New York c 
law concerning criteria for review of separation agreements. 
On analysis, the difference in criteria may be more sernan·. 
than real. Should the Court find the difference to be real, 
counsel submits that this is an appropriate time to reconsider 
what criteria Utah should apply. 
The Utah criteria was most recently stated in Pearson v. 
Pearson, 561 P2d 1082. 
There, the question was whether the trial court should he 
accepted the parties' stipulation of settlement made in open co~ 
The court instead accepted the stipulation in part, and rnodifie: 
it in part. The Utah Supreme Court ruled: 
"It is noted at the outset that the trial court, pursuant 
to U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-5, may make such orders in relatioo 
to property as may be equitable and parties cannot by 
contract completely defeat the authority expressly ~on­
ferred by said statute. It is the court's prerogative 
to make whatever disposition of property, including the 
rights in such contract, as it deems fair, equitable_a~ 
necessary for the protection and welfare of the parties-
-16-
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The court need not necessarily abide by the terms of the 
litigants' stipulations, and although such should be re-
spected and given great weight, the court is not duty 
bound to carry over the terms thereof." 
New York holdings will be cited later, but to give contrast 
to_the Pearson holding, the New York rules will be summarized now. 
They provide that a properly executed separation agreement is to 
be honored by the trial court, unless the trial court is persuaded 
that the agreement was tainted by "fraud," "duress," "concealment 
of assets," or "gross overreaching," (also called "palpable unfairness) 
Even though the court finds the agreement valid at its incep-
tion, it can still be modified at trial if there has been a substan-
tial change of circumstance since its execution, by the same crite=ia 
that a Utah decree can be modified for change of circumstance. 
The qualifying language in Pearson, that the parties cannot 
by contract "completely defeat" the authority of the court, implies 
that the parties can reasonably, partially, defeat the court's 
authority. That is, if the agreement appears reasonably sound, 
so as not to "defeat" equity, Pearson implies the agreement should 
be upheld. 
Other language in the quoted section from Pearson supports 
this interpretation, as the court adds that "the litigants' 
stipulations ... should be respected and given great weight ... 
This must also mean that the trial court should not invade 
the set terms of an agreement without very substantial cause. 
On reflective consideration, these qualifying terms may well 
accord with the New York criteria. If so, the New York criteria 
-17- I 
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might have some advantage, because of their well defined legal 
meanings, in assisting counsel and trial judges in preparation 
and evaluation of separation agreements. 
The basis for the New York criteria are: 
First, contract. The rights given and obligations assume( 
by a separation agreement, particularly when lived out by the 
parties, are matters of contract. These contracts are extre~t 
important contracts to the people involved. 
A party who performs a contract in good faith should be a:. 
to expect the aid of the court in holding the other party equal'. 
to the contract. Such person shouldn't be advised by his attorr. 
that his performance of, and reliance on, the contract can easL 
go for naught because the court will modify the contract in any 
way it sees fit, i.e., equitable. 
The New York law applies the concepts of contract law as 
firmly to domestic contracts as to other contracts. 
It tailors the contract approach by using modifying criU~ 
that are particularly appropriate to domestic law. "Gross over· 
reaching,"--one of the New York criteria--is an example. It is 
scarcely appropriate to general contract law, but highly appropr: 
to domestic law because it gives the court clear authority to me 
where one spouse has simply beaten the other down into submissic 
to bad terms. 
The second New York criteria is judicial restraint. It i: 
extremely difficult for a court to do equity on existing circ~· 
stances, and harder yet for past circumstances. 
-18-
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What appears inequitable in viewing the agreement today might 
have appeared equitable at the time of its execution. 
This is particularly true because self-serving parties change 
their testimony to meet their purposes, so that what facts existed 
at tlie time of agreement execution may well appear in a different 
form and be accepted by the court, at trial. 
The case at bar gives an example. 
At trial, Major Rost testified that he was pressured into 
signing the agreement to try to save his marriage, yet on arrival 
in Utah, his wife turned around and left him 3 days later without 
cause, making only a show on her part of an effort to reconcile, 
and thereby getting him stuck to a bad agreement that she could 
use as grounds and terms for a divorce a year later in New York. 
(T 269, L 25 - T 270, L 14; T 275, L 6-18; T 290, L 5-11; T 310, 
L 15-29) His purpose was to break the financial terms (and he 
suceeded) 
How different his testimony at a prior hearing--where the 
issue was abaternent--and his purpose then was to show his family 
wasn't deeply rooted in New york, so that New York shouldn't be 
the trial situs. This testimony was given by him on August 31, 
1977, at the abatement hearing before Judge Wahlquist and is at 
page 5 of this Brief. (T 206, L 9-30) 
A wise sense of judicial restraint, a healthy suspicion of 
hindsight, is appropriate. 
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The third basic New York rationale is peace. It is f~ 
better for parties to negotiate and agree on terms of separat~ 
or divorce, knowing they are going to be substantially bound b·.· 
those terms, than it is for them to feel that such agreements 
can easily be invaded by the trial courts, because that leads 
either to the agreements being casually violated by the parties 
or to the agreements not being made. Both of these consequence: 
produce litigation, attorney fees, and emotional stress to the 
parties and their families. To honor a properly executed agree· 
ment is a judicial act favoring amicable resolution of domestl: 
problems. 
Other Utah cases include Klein v. Klein, 544 P2d 472; 
Pearson v. Pearson, 561P2d1080; Madsen v. Madsen, 2 U2d 423, 
276 P2d 917; Christensen v. Christensen, 18 U2d 315, 422 P2d 5~ 
Callister v. Callister, 1 U2d 34, 261 P2d 944; and Barraclou~ 
v. Barraclough, 100 U2d 196, 111 P2d 792. 
Klein, supra, touches on the contract rationale stating: 
"Plaintiff advances the proposition that it would be neit:. 
fair nor proper to enter a 'consent decree' purportingtc 
be based on the agreement of a party who does not agree 
thereto at the time of final submission to the court. 
This appears to be a sound proposition when applied to 
appropriate circumstances. But it is also true that ue 
same rules apply to binding parties to such an agreement 
as apply to any other agreement. If there is any_justi· 
fication in law or equity for avoiding or repudiating a 
stipulation, and he timely does so, he is entitled to be 
relieved from it, otherwise not." [Emphasis added] 
The timely repudiation requirement recognized in Kle~ 
agrees with New York rationale relative to contract, that a pa: 
who executes a contract in good faith will change position w 
-20-
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detriment in reliance on the contract if the other party can later 
freely repudiate. 
In the case at bar, there was no prompt repudiation of the 
Agreement of Separation by either party. 
Somewhat apposite is Callister, supra. The decree incorporat-
ed a settlement agreement between the parties. Subsequently, one 
of the parties sought to modify the decree based on change of 
circumstances. 
The other party resisted arguing that not only was the decree 
of divorce entered final, but that regardless of that, as the 
decree incorporated the contract of settlement agreement, the 
other party was bound to the contract regardless of the decree. 
The Utah Supreme Court made short work of that argument hold-
ing that nothing could take away from the Utah trial court the 
power under 30-3-5, UCA (1953) to do equity in domestic cases. It 
did qualify this by holding that there had to be an appropriate 
proof of change of circumstances in order to relieve a party from 
the effect of an existing decree, and that if such were proved, it 
would also relieve the party from the binding effect of a separation 
agreement. 
The Callister acknowledgement of change of circumstances to 
modify an agreement is appropriate. 
There is so much case law on what constitutes "change of 
circumstance" that many cases to modify a decree are never brought 
because counsel advises the client that they can't meet the change 
of circumstance test. 
-21-
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Would it not be entirely appropriate to apply the same 
specific criteria to a separation agreement? 
A judicial doctrine of judicial self-restraint has long t' 
recognized in Utah. That is, the substantial change of circ~-
stance test must be met before a decree of divorce will be mod:·· 
fied even though it might be equitable to modify lacking such c: 
., 
The judicial restraint in not modifying existing decrees, 
even though simple equity might justify that, is no different i' 
concept than applying a similar criteria to thoughtfully execut', 
separation agreements. 
It is recognized that a court can correct drafting erron 
in a separation agreement just as it can correct drafting. error 
in any other contract. 
Before approaching specific New York case holdings, itw~ 
be well to note as stated in 24 AmJur 2d, Divorce & Separation, 
§884, that under basic rules of Conflict of Laws, a separation 
agreement is to be interpreted according to the law of the stat:. 
where it is made. New York law would clearly have upheld the 
separation agreement as drawn because, as Judge Hyde found, it' 
properly executed in all respects and on the second stage, chan:, 
of circumstance, there was no adverse change of circumstance f:: 
Major Rost, other than his voluntary excursion into short tern, 
high payment, debt, which does not persuasively appear necessar.· 
in view of the fact that he had reduced his total indebtedness. 
To what extent would courts of New York, if they were t~ 
a i•' this case, accept or modify the Separation Agreement entere ·· 
-22-
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by the plaintiff and defendant, in view of the fact that the 
Agreement provides by the parties' joint consent that it be inter-
preted by the laws of New York State and that it be the terms of 
any divorce granted to either party. 
~ect~on 21. Le~al Inter~retation. "All matters affecting 
the interpretation of this Separation Agreement and the 
rights of the parties hereto shall be governed by the laws 
of the State of New York." (Annex 1, P 19) 
Section 23. Reconciliation and Matrimonial Decrees. (b) 
"Both parties agree, stipulate and consent that no judg-
ment, order or decree in an action for divorce or separa-
tion, whether brought in the State of New York, or in any 
other state or country having jurisdiction of the parties 
hereto, shall make any provision for alimony or affect 
the property rights of either party inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Separation Agreement ... ". (Annex 1, 
p 20) 
"Contemporary theory, embodied in Section 170 of the 
Domestic Relations Law, sanctions the incorporation of a 
Separation Agreement into a divorce decree whether the 
divorce was contested or non-contested, and promotes the 
concept of a pre-divorce agreement. Generally, therefore, 
a Court will not inquire into the adequacy of the provi-
sions made in an agreement unless that agreement is palpably 
unfair or inadequate. While there is no presumption, bind-
ing or rebuttable, that a separation agreement adequately 
provides for child support, the fact of negotiations be-
tween two parties having knowledge of the requirements 
of the children and theoretically, at least, equally 
concerned about their welfare, suggests persuasively that 
the agreement is fair. The fact that the law does permit 
modification upon proof of a change in circumstances pro-
vides an avenue of relief in the event problems should 
arise later on." Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 353 NYS2d 819 
(1974) 
"Husband and wife may agree upon the scale on which the 
home will be maintained, or if they live apart, they may 
agree on a reasonable amount which the husband should pay 
for the support of his wife and children ..... Such agree-
ments, lawful when made, will be enforced like other agree-
ments unless impeached or challenged for s~me cause recog~ 
nized by law. It is not in the power of either party acting 
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alone and against the will of the other to destroy or 
change the agreement. In such case this court has said: 
'The law looks favorably upon and encourages settlements 
made ou~side.of courts betwee~ parties to a controversy. 
If, as in this case, the parties have legal capacity to 
contract, the subject of settlement is lawful and the 
contract without fraud or duress is properly and volun-
tarily executed, the court will not interfere.' " Goldman 
v. Goldman, 282 NY 296, 26 NE2d 265 (1940) -----
Since the decision in Galusha v. Galusha, 138 NY 272, ~ 
1889, the New York courts consistently have given great weight 
and preference to separation agreements. 
The weight is not absolute. As indicated above, an agree· 
ment can be modified if palpably unjust or unfair. It can also 
be modified or set aside if induced by fraud or duress. Stoddar 
v. Stoddard, 227 NY 13, 124 NE 91 (1919). 
It can also be modified if there has been a substantial 
change of circumstances since entry of the agreement to time of 
divorce, as set forth in McMains v. McMains, 15 NY 2d 283, 206 
NE2d 185, 258 NYS2d 93 (1965). 
Subject only to specific judicial findings of duress, frn 
palpable injustice, or substantial change of circumstances, the 
Separation Agreement should stand as a matter of policy. In accc· 
see: 
Smith v. Smith, 349 NYS2d 874 (1973) 
Seligman v. Seligman, 356 NYS2d 978 (1974) 
Morse v. Morse, 357 NYS2d 534 (1974) 
Riemer v. Riemer, 299 NYS2d 318 (1969) 
Millner v. Millner, 301 NYS2nd 250 (1969) 
Moat v. Moat, 277 NYS2d 921, (1967) 
In Re Kendall, 126 NYS2d 684 (1953) 
Manketo v. Manketo, 100 NYS2d 269 (1950) 
Wimpfheimer v. Wimpfheimer, 29 NYS 102 (1941) 
Goldman v. Goldman, 282 NY 296 (1940) 
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One of the most important functions of a Decree of Divorce 
is to create a wall between parties. The wall is to prevent per-
sonal disagreements staying alive between them. 
It seems appropriate, when parties divorce, to assume that 
theif personal relationship has failed. If they could resolve 
their personal difficulties, they would not separate or divorce. 
Insofar as a decree of divorce has very few terms, does not 
define their future relationships, duties and privileges, they 
dispute these matters. 
Insofar as a decree is drawn in detail, with thoughtful atten-
tion to the needs of the parties as well as can be forecast, it 
serves to avoid these personality conflicts. It does this by say-
ing, in the event of such and such happening, the provision is such 
and such. By being specific and in point, it avoids the parties 
having to fight out the resolution of these matters. 
This is conceptually the same as a good contract which pro-
vides for as many eventualities as can be reasonably anticipated. 
Then, when facts arise, adverse to one or the other party to a con-
tract, rather than fighting, they see the contract, see their obli-
gations and act on that basis without warfare. 
As example, the Agreement between the parties here specifi-
cally takes cognizance of the fact that Major Rost is in the Air 
Force, that accordingly he may frequently be away from the children 
for long periods of time. (Annex 1, P 6-11) It protects him in 
this regard in important aspects. Whenever his duties might take 
him unexpectedly into the area where the children reside, he is 
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given carte blanche rights of visiting without notice to incorpor 
ate this occasional, but unpredictable, tr ave ling characteristic 
of Air Force personnel. It provides that should he be away for 
long periods of time, this is in no way to prejudice him and he 
is to be freely entitled to exercise visits whenever he can n~ 
less. 
In Utah, traditionally, separation agreements and decrees 
of divorce attempt to be quite brief. Utah also has a tremendo_ 
volume o:: litigation after divorces are entered seeking interpr; 
tation of areas not covered by the decrees. This indicates ther 
is much to be said in favor of a long, thoughtful and detail~ 
Agreement or decree. 
Too much human damage is done in domestic litigation. At: 
neys are gradually learning that in the field of domestic ln~ 
traditional duty of "winning" is inappropriate. 
A domestic case is not a case to be won, but a problem tc 
solved. 
If there is a winner, there is a loser. 
the equation is entirely human. 
In domestic law, 
A father, though divorced, is still father and breadwinne'. 
A mother, though divorced, is still mother and needs financial 
stability and emotional acceptance to be a good mother. 
Neither can perform these roles well if they feel strongl: 
and rightly, that they are "losers" in their case. Bitterness, 
defeat, or hostility will cripple their efforts. 
The entire trend of American law is away from an adversar 
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procedure in domestic cases. This is laudable. A comprehensive 
article appearing in the Family Law Reporter of the Bureau of 
National Affairs is in point. 
The article appears at 2 FLR 3083, October 12, 1976. The 
FLR is probably the most prestigious source in the field of dom-
estic law. 
The article sets forth the approach and criteria of the 
American Arbitration Association's Family Dispute Services, which 
in turn is sponsored by the American Bar Association. 
The essence of the article is the use of arbitration on a 
skilled and organized basis to avoid divorce and separation, to 
provide for divorce and separation agreements in those borderline 
cases that might end either in reconciliation or divorce, and for 
sound resolution of disputes when divorce goes through. 
As stated (2 FLR 3085), in reference to separation agree-
ments: "Both parties benefit from a lasting agreement fair to 
all concerned." 
As cited in the article, the states that are using this 
arbitration machinery, including the separation agreements, in-
clude Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, 
Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 
In closing this argument, the counterpoint to that proposed 
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herein, is that agreements may be frequently tilted, put in su: 
a way that they are unfair as a whole, even though the individt: 
parts might appear tenable. To restrict judicial intervention: 
going beyond a criteria of simple equitable principles would be 
allow such poor contracts. 
In answer, it is respectfully submitted that while this:: 
boding will undoubtedly come true on occasion, it is equally pr: 
able that courts, in applying hindsight after parties have rek 
and changed position, will miss the mark. 
In balance, counsel submits that the determinative factor: 
are that a greater judicial approval of separation and agreemer.: 
will result in their broader use. This, in turn, can reason~~ 
be expected to produce some reconciliations because the parties 
can separate safely knowing their agreements will be honored if 
the reconciliation fails, thus giving the reconciliation a chan: 
will result in agreements rather than litigation; and will save 
the time of courts. Should only one of these benefits come to 
fruition, the doctrine will be justified. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS 
WHICH CONTESTED JURISDICTION IN UTAH AND WHICH 
SOUGHT TO ABATE UTAH PROCEEDINGS IN FAVOR OF 
NEW YORK. 
As Texas, not Utah, is Major Rost' s state of permanent re: 
dence, and he has no ties in Utah other than his present duty 
assignment, it would be more appropriate to let New York procee: 
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if such is necessary to enforce or modify the decree once Major 
Rost has left this state. 
If Mrs. Rost is not relieved of her commitment not to go 
forward in New York, it would require her following Major Rost to 
whatever state or foreign country he goes to to have the decree 
enforced, which might make the decree unenforcible. 
The facts are stated in Annex 2 and pages 6 to 9 of this 
Brief. 
In essence, appellant stands on the facts, law and argument 
contained in her Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. (Annex 2) 
Frequently, the appellate court relies on and accepts the 
discretion of the trial court in its decision as to whether or not 
to retain jurisdiction. Appellant submits this case is not appro-
priate. 
In regard to the trial court's hearing of appellant's Special 
Appearance to contest jurisdiction, the issue raised in that plead-
ing was not whether the court had jurisdiction over Major Rost and 
the domestic relationship. This was conceded. The point was 
whether, under the Union Ski Company v. Union Plastics case, cited 
in the interlocutory petition, the court should decline the juris-
diction it had because another state was better situated to handle 
the entire case. 
Appellant did not appear at the ex parte hearing at which 
Judge Wahlquist denied that Special Appearance! A transcript of 
that July 11, 1977, hearing is attached (T 185-189). 
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Reading of that transcript indicates that neither Judge 
Wahlquist nor Major Rest's counsel ever considered the issue 
raised by the Special Appearance. They took the title, to 
"Contest Jurisdiction," examined Major Rost as to whether~ 
had resided in Utah for more than 90 days, and the pleading wa; 
summarily denied. 
The trier of fact not having seen the point, nor read~ 
pleading as is apparent from the transcript, does not put the 
trial court in a position where its ruling is to be given di~ 
tionary approval. 
Similarly, in the hearing on August 31, 1977, in whi~J. 
Wahlquist denied appellant's Plea in Abatement, Judge WahlqUi 
allowed Major Rost to raise a claim of custody of both childre: 
Judge Wahlquist' s order put custody of both children be'. 
the trial court. While the son, John, was then residing tempc: 
with Major Rost, the daughter was not then in Utah. Her perma: 
residence was with her mother in New York. She had visited w~ 
Major Rost from August 12 to August 28. In his complaint, he 
conceded the custody of both children to Mrs. Rost. It was o: 
August 31, 1977, that he raised, for the first time, a plea:: 
custody of both children. 
The Utah court had no power of any kind over the daught: 
and any order it might make concerning her could not be en~r 
Brown v. Cook et al., 123 U 505, 260 P2d 544 
Clark v. Clark, 261 P2d 207 (Okla, 1961) 
McMillin et al. v. McMillan, 158 P2d 444 (Colo. 1945) 
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Because she was not in Utah when a complaint asking for her 
custody or amendment of complaint, was presented, jursidiction over 
her remained solely in New York. 
In holding jurisdiction of the entire case in Utah, the order 
on the August 31, 1977,hearing is clearly in error in regard to 
the daughter. 
As a result, had the sole custody of the son, John, been 
awarded to Major Rost, the result would have been to split the 
children. This is sometimes necessary but only under the most 
grievious of circumstances. 
This is a point that counsel, under pressure of the hearing, 
did not appreciate. After all, custody was then raised for the 
first time. 
By itself, the court's entire lack of jurisdiction over the 
daughter is a persuasive reason for the court declining jurisdic-
tion or abating Utah proceedings in favor of New York. 
Counsel submits that three basic policy considerations should 
be considered as criteria as to which state, when there is concur-
rent jurisdiction, should exercise ongoing jurisdiction in a dom-
estic case. 
First, importance of first filing. See discussion at Annex 
2, page 8. 
Second, comparative expense. Here custody was in issue. In 
which state did the witnesses, such as the three psychiatrists re-
side? In which case would it be most feasible and economical to 
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give a full evidentiary presentation to the court so it could~ 
an advised decision, as is necessary on a matter as critical as 
custody. The Major didn't offer to pay these expenses, and 5~ 
couldn't. 
Third, broadest jurisdiction. When Major Rost originalli· 
filed his complaint, the Utah court had the jurisdiction over r.: 
and the domestic relationship only. It lacked jurisdiction of: 
children, and in personam jurisdiction of the wife. The Utah c: 
could have made no enforcible orders concerning the children thE 
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Wahlquist erred:: 
his ruling. 
SUMMARY 
Major Rost used the State of Utah as a foil to break his 
sworn contract, which he would have been compelled to honor in: 
state where he executed it. 
It is proper that the Utah court hold him to his contract. 
and that it free Mrs. Rost to proceed in New York as is appr~ 
priate in the future. 
She prays attorney fees and costs. 
DATED June 16, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KING 
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I certify I mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief to Pete N. Vlahos, attorney for respondent, 2447 Kiesel 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, U. S. mail, postage prepaid, June 16, 
1978. 
Hazel Sykes 
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MARVIN MALIN 
CUNSELDR AT I.AW 
5 MDRTH BROADWAY 
CHO, NEW YORK 11753 
AGREE!"!ENT OF SEPARATION 
d 
_;Y 
THIS AGREEMENT ma e this '-" Jay of June, 197o 
:1 between JANET ROST, residing at 34 Wilson Road, Valley Strea: 
" New York, (hereinafter referred to as the ":nFE" and/or 
,
1 
"MOTHER"), and PAUL ROST, residing at 65 .Home Street, Mab 
I 
' New York, (hereinafter referred to as the "HUSBMID" and/or 
"FATHER"). 
W I T N E S S E T H: 
WHEREAS, the parties are Husband and Wife, 
having been married in Brooklyn, New York, on the 18th day 
of June, 1962 and 
WHEREAS, there are two children of the marri: 
1, JOHN KENNETH ROST, born January 24, 1964 and SUZANNE LOUISE:· 
:I born May 17, 1966, (hereinafter referred to as the "CHILDRE:: 
" 
and there are no expectant additional issue of the marriage; 
WHEREAS, certain unhappy and irreconcilable 
,: differences have arisen between the parties, as a result of 
'
1 h' h h h 1 d i' w ic t ey ave separated, and are now iving separate an 
I! apart from each other; and 
WHEREAS, it is the intention of the parties· 
· continue to so live separate and aoart from each other, and 
it is the_~r desire to enter into an agreement, under which 
their respective financial and property rights, and the c~ 
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IN MALIN 
ii.QR AT LAW 
and custody of their unemancipated children and all other 
respective rights, remedies, privileges and obligations to 
'each other, arising out of the marriage relation, or otherwise, 
' shall be fully prescribed and bounded thereby; and 
WHEREAS, the "WIFE" hereto has been fully, 
separately and independently apprised and advised of her 
, legal rights, remedies, privileges and obligations, arising 
, out of the marriage relation or othenvise, by counsel of her 
oWTI choice and selection, and the "HUSBAND" refusing to be 
represented by counsel and representing himself, and each having 
in addition thereto, made independent inquiry and investigation 
with respect to all of the same, and each ~aving been fully 
informed of the other's assets, property,' holdings, income 
and prospects; and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto each warrant and 
1 
represent to the other that they, and each of them fully under-
, stand all the terns, covenants, conditions, provisions and 
11 obligations incumbent upon each of them, by virtue of this' 
Separation Agreement to be performed, or contemplated by each 
of them to perform, and each believes the same to be fair, 
just, reasonable and to their respective individual best 
interests, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises 
and of the mutual covenants and promises contained herein, 
the parties hereto mutually agree as follows: 
- 2 -
ffH 6ROADWA'r' 
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1. SEPARATE RESIDENCE 
It shall be lawful for each of the parties her; 
at all times to live separate and apart from each other, and 
to reside in such place or places as either of them chooses o: 
deems fit, without intereference, direct or indirect, by the 
other party, as if such parties were single and unmarried. 
2. FREEDOM FROM INTERFERENCE 
Each party shall have the right to contract, 
carry01 and engage in any employment, business, trade or 
profession which either may deem fit, free from control, 
restraint, interference or harassment, direct or indirect 
i • by the other, in all respects as if such parties were sing~ 
11 
.I and unmarried. 
3. NO MOLESTATION 
Neither party shall in any way molest, disturb 
, or trouble the other, or interfere with the peace and comfort 
1 e>f the other, or compel or seek to compel the other to associi 
cohabit or dwell with him or her, by any action or proceeding 
.! or restoration of conjugal rights or by any means whatsoever. 
I 
4. SEPARATE OWNERSHIP 
1: 
Each party shall own, free of any claim or ri1' 
; of the oth:J', all of the items of property, real, personal an; 
- 3 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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' mixed, of any kind, nature or description and wheresoever 
~ MALIN 
I I A.T l.A..W 
situate, which are now owned by him or her, or which are now in 
his or her name, or to which he or she is, or may be, beneficially 
entitled or which may hereafter belong to or come to him or 
her with full power to him or to her to dispose of the same as 
fully and effectually in all respects and for all purposes 
, as if he or she were unmarried. 
5. RESPON9EILITY FOR DEBTS 
(a) Subject to the provision of this Separation 
Agreement, the "WIFE" covenants and represents that she has 
not heretofore, nor will she hereafter, incur or contract any 
debt, charge or liability whatsoever for which the "HUSBAND", 
his legal representatives or his property or estate may become 
11 
liable, except as set forth on Schedule A hereof, if any; and · 
11 
for so long as the "HUSBAND" complies with all the alimony and 
support provisions of this Separation Agreement, the "WIFE" 
further covenants to keep the "HUSBAND" free, harmless, and. 
I 
'. .indemnified of and from any and all debts, charges or liabilities 
hereafter contracted by her for herself or for the' account of 
any person, except as set forth on Schedule A hereof; if any. 
(b) The "HUSBAND" covenants at all times .to 
keep the "WIFE" free, harmless and indemnified of and from 
any and all debts, charges and liabilities heretofore contracted 
or incurred by him individually or jointly with the "WIFE" 
·--
l t 
- 4 -
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for which the "HUSBAND" and "WIFE" are, or may become liabl 
e, 
and agrees to pay the debts as mown on Schedule A hereof, if 
any. 
6. MUTUAL RELEASE AND DISCHARGE OF 
GENERAL CLAIHS 
Subject to the provisions of this Separati~ 
Agreement, each party has remised, released and forever dis· 
charged, and by these presents does for himself or herself, 
and his or her heirs, legal representatives, executors, 
administrators and assigns, remise, release and forever disc'. 
the other of and from all cause or causes of action, claims, 
' rights or demands whatsoever in law or in equity, which eitf.c 
of the parties hereto ever had or now has, against the other. 
except any or all cause or causes of action for divorc~ or 
separation, and any defenses either may rare to any divorce 
., or separation action now pending, or hereafter brought by th 
other. 
7. MUTUAL RELEASE AND DISCHARGE 
OF CLAIMS IN ESTATES 
Each party hereby releases,waives, and rel~· 
, quishes any and all rights that he or she may have or may 
hereafter acquire, as the other party's opouse under the 
. present or future laws of the State of New York, or any othe: 
.. jurisdiction, (a) to share in the estate of the other party 
-~ 
upon the latter's death; and (b) to act as executor or ad-
; ministrator of the other party's estate. This provision 
MARVIN MALIN l~ALIN 
:OUNBl:LDR AT LAW Ill At LA 
'5 NORTH BROADWAY 
CHO. NEW YORK 11753 - 5 -
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I 
is intended to, and shall constitute, a mutual waiver by the 
parties to take against each other's Last Will and Testament, 
,i now or hereafter in force, under the present or future laws 
:1 
of any jurisdict:kn whatsoever. The consideration for each 
party's waiver and release is the other party's reciprocal 
waiver and release. The parties intend, by the aforedescribed 
waiver and release, to relinquish any and all rights in and 
ilto each other's estate, including the rights of set-off now 
provided in Section 5-3.1 of the ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS 
'LAW of the State of New York, any and all distributive shares 
1 presently provided in Section 4-1.1 of the ESTATES, POWERS I 
i' AND TRUSTS LAW and all rights of election presently provided 
I! for L::-t Section 5-1.1 of said Law or any prior or subsequent 
similar provision of law of this or any other jurisdiction. 
8. IMPLEMENTATION 
The "HUSBAND" and "WIFE" shall, at any and all 
times, upon the request by the other party or his or her legal 
,, tepresentatives, make, execute and deliver any and all such 
other and further instruments as may be necessary or desirable 
, for the purpose of giving full force and effect to the pro-
visions of this Separation Agreement, without charge therefore. 
9. CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
-~ (a) The "HOTHER" shall have the absolute 
- 6 - \ 
·~ 
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matters of similar importarcce affecting the "CHILDREN" who 
'I , SE 
,i well-being, education and development, shall at all times be 
1
l the paramount consideration of the "FATHER" and "HOTHER". 
(i) The "MOTHER" agrees, that in the event 0; 
acute illness of any one of the "CHILDREN", at any time, the 
" "FATHER" shall have the right of visitation with the "CHILD" 
" at the place which he or she is confined. 
(j) Although the parties hereby acknowledge 
that nothing herein contained shall be construed as an oblig0 
tion or duty on the part of the "FATHER" to exercise his 
" rights of visitation, nevertheless, the"FATHER" acknowledges 
,, need for planning activities for the "CHILDREN" and further 
acknowledges that disappointing them may have serious, adver: 
effects upon them. Accordingly, the "FATHER" agrees that, 
'
1 on all occasions when he does not plan to exercise t · s righc: 
of visitation, or expects that he will be tardy in so doing 
intends to return the "CHILDREN" at an earlier hour, he will 
give to the "MOTI:IER" as much advance notice as possible in o: 
that she may make appropriate plans for the "CHILDREN". 
(k) The parties shall exert every reason~~ 
effort to maintain free access and unhampered contact betwee· 
the "CHILDREN" and each of the parties, and to foster a fee~ 
of affection between the "CHILDREN" and the other party. 
Neither party shall do anything which may estrange the "CH( 
.<# 
- 9 - I
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from the ether party or injure the "CHILDREN'S" opinion as to 
their "MOTHER" or "FATHER" or Tflhich may hamper the free and 
natural development of the "CHILDREN'S" love and respect for 
the other party. 
(1) Each parent shall be entitled to complete, 
detailed information from any pediatrician, general 'physician, 
dentist, consultant or specialist attending the. "CHILDREN" 
II for any reason whatsoever and to be furnished with copies of 
'I 
1
! any reports given by the latter, or any of them to the other 
I[ parent. 
11 (m) Each parent iii.all be entitled to complete, 
·detailed information from any teacher or sc.hool giving instruc-
tion to the "CHILDREN" and to be furnished with copies of all 
reports given by them, or any of them, to the other parent. 
(n) The "HOTHER" agrees that, on all occasions 
of visitation or vacation, she will provide the "CHILDREN" with 
proper clothing and apparel. 
(o) It is the "FATHER'S" intention to exercise 
.fully his rights of visitation as herein provided, but the 
exercise thereof shall be entirely optional with him, and 
his failure to exercise such rights on any particular occasion 
'1 shall not be deemed or construed to constitute a waiver of his 
rights thereafter to full compliance with the provisions hereof. 
' 
J ~ MALIN 
CR A,- LA'N 
t llllOAC>W,t.,y 
W 'f::IR!( 11753 
'L(_ 
(p) All rights of visitation and vacation privi-
leges shall be exercised with both "CHILDREN" at the same time . 
.. 
1 -; 
- 10 -
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r 
(q) It is understood and agreed that in th, 
of the death or adjudicated mental incompetency of the"MOTH: 
the "FATHER" shall have absolute custnr1y and control of th, 
"CHILDREN" irrespective of any provision in any Will execut, 
by the "MOTHER". 
10. SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE 
(a) The "HUSBAND" shall pay to the "WIFE"as 
for her support and maintenaI).ce, by check, postal money ord,· 
or allotment, if possible, at her present place of residenc' 
or at such other addresses as she may hereafter, in writing, 
designate to the "HUSBAND", the sum of $350.00 per month 
commencing on the first day of each month succeeding the 
date of this Separation Agreement and continuing on the fin 
day of each succeeding month. 
(b) The parties hereby agree that the suppor 
and maintenance hereinabove set forth shall cease upon the 
'earliest happening of one of the following events: 
; hereto, or 
!' 
:! • 
(1) The death of either of the parties 
(2) The remarriage of the "WIFE", regarc 
1 less of whether such remarriage shall thereafter be terminati 
''.by divorce, annulment or otherwise. 
(c) In addition to the foregoing, the "HUSBi:: 
shall maintain his benefits in the Civilian Health and l!edic: 
,; Program of the Uniformed Services (known as CHAMPUS) coverin' 
;i the "WIFE" .<tJrovided she qualifies for said coverage. 
- 11 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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lOA. LIF:C: INSURANCE 
(a) The "HUSBAND" agrees that he will maintain 
in full force and effect, and neither pledge, hypothecate nor 
encumber, the policy insuring his life, described at the foot 
' of this paragraph, with the "WIFE" as irrevocable beneficiary 
thereof until themrlier of the following events: 
(1) remarriage of the "WIFE". 
(2) Youngest "CHILD" reaching age of TWENTY-
TWO (22) years. 
(b) In the event of the death or remarriage 
of the "WIFE" before the youngest "CHILD" reaches the age of 
1: TWENTY-TWO (22) years, the "CHILD" or "CHILDREN" shall be equal 
contingent beneficiaries of the said policy. 
(c) Promptly after the execution of this 
I 
:: Separation Agreement, the "HUSBAND" shall deliver to the "WIFE" 
11 said insurance policy, or certificate or instrument evidencing 
such irrevocable designation of the "WIFE" and the "CHILDREN" 
as beneficiaries under said insurance policy as set foI!h herein-
' a-bove, and the "HUSBAND" further agrees that he will, at any 
time upon request, execute and deliver to the "WIFE" whatever 
instruments or documents or letters of authorization which may 
'be required to enable the "WIFE" to document that the "HUSBAND" 
I.has complied with all of the provisions hereof. 
(d) The "HUSBAND" agrees and undertakes to pay, 
or cause to,, be paid all premiums, due and owing, on said insurance 
- lla -l MAUN 
AT LAW 
IRCAOWA.y 
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,, policy at least FIFTEEN (15) days prior to the grace period 
thereof; and to deliver to the "WIFE", forthwith upon her re\ 
therefor, documentation of such payment. 
(e) All dividends hereafter payable under saj,' _ 
. c 
P policy shall belong exclusively to the "HUSBAND", who shall 
have the cption of accepting payment thereo= or applying them 
in reduction of premiums. 
NAME OF COMPANY 
UNITED BENEFIT LIFE 
i! INSURANCE COMPANY 
I (Air Force Associa-
, tion Life Insurance) 
.<# 
POLICY NO. 
Group Policy No. 
C'LG-2625, 
Cer:: if- 2817 0 
- llb -
TYPE 
I 
FACE AMOU;:. 
Life Insur- Per schedu: f 
ance in declin'.: 
balance 
(see attac: 1 
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J1ai. PauLE_._ll-ost~----------- 28170 
• '.A~IE OF MEMBER CERTIFIC-\TE•-'-:-,,:-:-l.J-:-:M----c-B-E_R _______ _ 
Seotember }0"--'---'1=9._7,_,,3'-----_________ __.:03_0. 00____ _Qu_arterly 
UFECTJVE DATE PRE.'!JUM MODE OFP -'""\'-Y-M-EN-1 -T 
Beneficiary: Shown on member's application unless subsequently changed as provided herein. 
MEMBERS INSURA:'<CE PLAN 
i HIGH OPTION PL\r" D STANDARD PLAN rn 
DEPENDENTS LIFE 
YES D 
INSURANCE 
NO fu 
c: If depenuent insurance is provided, the derendents insured shall be those named (unless ct~leted by 
11der) on any attach~d copy of the applicaticn: subject tc the DEPEl\DE:'\TS L JFE INSURANCE 
PROVISIONS herein. 
' r, 
The member named above is insured under Group Policy Number GLG-2625 (herein referred to as the 
po!icy) issued to First 'lational Bank of \linneapolis as Trustee 0f the Air Force Association Group 
Insurance Trust, subiect to the terms and cond1iions of the policy. foe the appli.::ihle amount specified 
in the Plan of Insurance. Pavm~nt of the amount f,,r w~!cl1 the cncmber is ins,•red sh.ill be m~de to the 
beneficiary upon receipt cl-due proof that the member died '"hi1e insured ac.:ording to terms of the po!i.::. 
The policy is delivered in the State of \1 in'nesota and is governed by the IJ\\ s of that jurisd;ction. 
The insuranc11 evidenced by this certificate i' pro' ided under and is sub_:ect to all cf the provisions cf the 
polic). certain of" hich provisions are set forth 1n this certificate. · 
under-.vritten by 
(Herein c:il!cd the Company) 
.Omaha, :"-kbraska 
This certificate supersedes and replaces any certificate previously issued under the po1icy. 
~~~~ 
.. ~ E\ecut1re \'ice President and Secretary 
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PART A. PiArJ Of I iJS!.l~AIJCE 
Foti :\lE\lflFRS O'\L \ 
The amount of insurJnc:e for a_mcmber shJll be 1n ,1ccordJn:c 11Hh the rr~m1um subm1tt·:d. the Plan requested, 
tiated on the attached c<1py ot the '1rpl1ct!l1on J;1d the :nunber s 'it;.iincd a:;e at the _time of death. A cha; 
shall become effective only on Jn '1nn11ers'1ry JJtc J'. dc,erm1n:J by t.ie dkct1\e l1'1tc ul this certificate pr01
1
t· 
bcr makes application satisfactor) to th,~ Co~1p.iny 111th1n th1rt: •. -unc d.i,, 1ollo111ng such d.ite. A membermai~ 
increase in amount of insurance by a chang~ ot PLrn' on or Jlter his s1xt1cth b1rthd,1.y. · 
Ifthememberistotallydisabled'1sdcf1neJinthe\\'Al\ER Of' PRF\lll_;\I BE'\EFJT IN THE EYE:\TQf 
DISABILITY provision as pro11ded herein, such member wtll not be eligible to apply fur a change in Plans, 
above until the annivers.iry date follo\\ing the J.itc such member 1' no longer tc1tJlly d1s.ibkd. · 
Amount of Insurance 
HIGH OPTlON PLA:'ll 
$100,000.00 . '.'''' '. 
Attained Age of \I ember 
LIFE INSLRAi\.CE BE'·;EFJT 
.20 
90,000.00 ' .. ' . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ....... 25 
24. 
29 
34. 
39 
75.000.00 . 30 
60.C'.JO.OO ... 35 
37 .500.00 -<O 
22,500.00 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' .... '-<5 49 
I 5,000 00 .... , , . , .. , . '50 54. 
I 5,000 00 . '.'.' ...... 55 59. 
l l.250 00 ' . ' ' ' ' . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' . '' '60 64. 
6,.JOLI UO . 65 69. 
. 70 1 5 3,-~0.1JO 
i :.soo 00 
:2.soo.00 
.. ACC!DE:HAL DEATH GE'IEFIT. 
.. A\IATlOI" DE . .\TH BEl\iEFIT. 
Amount of lnsuranc: 
STA '\DARO PLA,\ 
. .. 566,000.00 
60,000 00 
50.000.00 
-<0.000.00 
25,000.00 
.. ' "' 15 000.00 
10,00000 
I 0,000.00 
7 ,500.00 
4,000 00 
.... ' ' . ' . ' ' 2,500 00 
12.500 00 
15,00000 
Benefits terminate on the first premium due date c01nc1ding with or 1mmcdiatelv follo"'ing the attainment of age;e 
Attained Age of 
Member 
20 - 39 
40 - 44 
-45 - 49 
50 - 59 
60 - 64 
65 - 69 
• 70 - 75 
FOR DEPE:--.OE:\TS 0'.'IU' 
Coverc.gc for Spouse 
S6.00U.OO 
5.250.00 
-\.050.00 
3.000 00 
2,250 00 
1,:00 (JO 
750.00 
Coverage for 
Each Child 
(Age Six :'\lonths bu1 Le. 
T-han Age Tl'.enty-ore 
S2,000.00 
2.000.00 
2.000.00 
2,000 00 
2,000.00 
2,000.00 
2,000 00 
The amount of insurance for a dependent child age fifteen days but Jes, than six months sh'111 be 5250.00. 
PART B. r.m.icms HlSURAilG PrlOVISIONS 
ELIGICILITY - The following classes of p~r,orb are digible for the insurance provided bv the policy: 
Members of the Air Force A,sociation under si;,ty 1 cars vi age,., ho are: 
(a) active members of the Armed Force, of tlic l' 1;1t•2d St:iic·c: 
(b) members of the NatiOl)jll Guard or Ready Rc,ervc l-orces of the l'nited States: c11 
(c) Armed Forces Acade~y calkls or ROTC c:idct;. 
Members who reside in Florida, New Jersc\, Oiiiu, ur Texas at the time of '1prlic~tion for this insurJnce Jre~· 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF \iF.\lllrR J:\Sl P..\ ·,cE _ Each member ,hall becc•me in,urcd on the last d3 :• oi,I "' 
m which the application for this insurance is appro1 ed by the Cum pan' .inJ the 1nit1al premium 1s paid. '•., 
''° 
- '· 
··~ 
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11. CHILD SUPPORT 
(a) The "FATHER" will pay to the "MOTHER" 
'as and for the support and maintenance of the unemancipated 
"CHILDREN" by check, t 1 d 11 pos a money or er or a otment, if possible, 
at her present place of residence, or at such other addresses 
as she may hereafter, in writing, designate to the "FATHER", 
•1 the sum of $300. 00 per month for each "CHILD" commencing on 
the first day of each month succeeding the date of this Separation . 
• i Agreement and continuing on the same day of each succeeding month. 
(b) The support and maintenance of each un-
emancipated "CHILD" shall cease upon the happening of an 
"Emancipation Event" as hereinafter defined .. 
(c) In addition to the foregoing, the "FATHER" 
,' shall maintain his benefits in the Civilian Health and Medical 
Program of the Uniformed Services (known as CHAMPUS), or an 
, equivalent plan or plans providing similar coverage, covering 
the "CHILDREN" during their minority; and, in the event of 
•
1 his failure so tQ do, he shall promptly pay, and forever sa-:e, 
, bold harmless and indemnify the "MOTHER" on account of all 
charges reasonable and necessarily incurred by her·on behalf 
' of the "CHILDRE~" for medical , dental, hospitalization and 
surgical expenses, including medications, nursing care, necessary 
appliances, psychiatric and psychological treatment; not 
including cosmetic treatment unless the need for same is 
occasioned by a traumatic episode, provided, however, that 
·"' 
"FATHER'S" liability shall be limited to expenses for treatment 
- 12 -
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such as would be covered by the aforementioned CHAlfPUS plan. ' 
(d) It is further agreed that any and all me(: 
11 and dental expenses incurred on behalf of the "CHILDREN" whic 
are not covered by the CHAMPUS plan shall be divided equally 
between the "HUSBAND" and "WIFE", 
(e) The "FATHER" shall not be obligated to 
I 
,l make any payment with respect. to the "CHILDREN'S" camp expen: 
When the time comes for the "CHILDREN" to attend camp, the 
'patti.es shall confer with a view to arriving at the choice o:. 
;, 
' a camp and the amount of the "FATHER'S" contribution to the 
expenses. 
:I 
(f) The "FATHER" agrees that' he will pay one·, 
fi half of the college tuition for the "CHILDREN", limited to 
I 
II h 1 • t e east expensive State College or University in the "HIFE' 
I 
I 
State of residence. 
12. EMANCIPATION EVENT 
The "CHILDREN" shall be deemed, for the purpo: 
of this Separation Agreement, to have been emancipated, as 
'tontemplated by Article ll(b) herein, upon the earliest 
happening of any of the following events: 
(a) Attaining the age of TWENTY-ONE (21 
years, or the completion of four academic years of college 
education, whichever last occurs, but in no event beyond the 
ldate on which the children attain the age of TWENTY -TWO (22) 
I years. Ho,wever, the "emancipation" shall be deemed to be 
- 13 -
,,, NORTH BACAOWAY 
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defined as extending beyond the TWENTY-FIRST (21) birthday of 
the "CHILDREN" only if, and so long as the "CHILDREN" continuously 
1 pursue a college education on a full-time and continuous basis, 
and with reasonable diligence; but in no event beyond the date 
on which the "CHILDREN" attain the age of TWENTY-TWO (22) years, 
if- school is being attended. "College education':' shall not 
include the pursuit of courses in the evening, unless it is 
I, 
a part of a daytime program. 
(b) Marriage of the "CHILDREN" even though 
such marriage may be void or voidable, and despite any sub-
sequent annulment thereof. 
(c) Permanent residenc~ away from the 
''·residence of the "MOTHER". A residence at' Boarding School, 
•I 
Camp or College is not to be deemed a residence away from the 
residence of the "XOTHER" sufficient to constitute emancipt:ion. 
(d) Death of the "CHILDREN" or the "FATHER". 
(e) Entry into the Armed Forces of the 
United States, ti;:> continue only so long as the "CHILDREN" are 
~embers of the Armed Forces before attaining the age of 
majority, so that in the event of discharge before· attaining 
majority, the "CHILDREN" shall be deemed not to have been 
fully emancipated, from discharge to time of majority. 
(f) Engaging in full-time employment upon 
and after attainment of the "CHILDREN" of the age of EIGHTEEN (18) 
years except that (i) engaging by the "CHILDREN" in partial, 
. ..-
- 14 -
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part-time er sporadic employment shall not constitute emancip, 
tion and (ii) engaging by the "CHILDREN"in full-time ernploym, 
during vacation and summer periods shall not be deemed emanc: 
tion. Emancipation stemming from employment shall be deemec 
terminated and nullified upon the cessation by the "CHILDRE:: 
for any reason, from full-time employment, and the period, i' 
any, from such termination until the earliest of any of the 
other events herein set forth, for all purposes under this 
1 Separation Agreement, be deemed a period prior to the occur:: 
' of such emancipation. 
13. INCOME TAX RETURNS 
(a) The "WIFE" agrees that. she will join wi: 
the "HUSBAND" in the execution and filing of all requisite · 
income tax returns for the calendar years, 1976 and 1977, E 
the parties are not divorced, and that all refunds, if any, 
:be divided in proportion to the tax paid by each party. 
(b) The "HUSBAND" does hereby agree that he 
forever save, hold harmless and indemnify the .!.'WIFE" on ace: 
·of all tax levies, assessments or fines arising out of said' 
and 1977 returns and any income tax returns heretofore fik 
.• jointly by the parties to the extent that the same are appl: 
to any item other than the "WIFE'S" independent income. 
(c) It is agreed between the parties that~ 
"HUSBAND" shall have the right to claim one "CHILD" to wit, 
JOHN KENNl:TH ROST, as a dependent on his income tax return: 
- 15 -
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the "WIFE" shall have the right to claimme "CHILD" to wit, 
SUZANNE LOUISE ROST, as a dependent on her income tax returns. 
14. WIFE'S INDEPENDENT INCOME 
Regardless of whatever income the "WIFE" may 
no~ or hereafter have or the source thereof, or whether earned 
1 or unearned, the same shall in no way affect or limit the 
obligation of the "HUSBAND" t"o provide for her support and for 
the support of the "CHILDREN" as herein required. 
15. :MARITAL ABODE 
Inasmuch as the "WIFE" and "CHILDREN" will 
shortly be unable to reside at their current residence, the 
"HUSBAND" agrees to be responsible for any security deposit 
rec:uired on any aprtment obtained by the "WIFE". Further, 
the "HUSBAND" also agrees to pay for any utility deposits required, 
16. PERSONAL PROPERTY 
(a) The parties have heretofore divided their 
personal property to their mutual satisaction, notwithstanding 
the fact that some of the property is still in storage. 
(b) The parties own a 1970 Trave1 Trailer and 
a 1971 Chevrolet Statin Wagon. Title to both shall belong 
to the "I-:'1SBArID", including equipment in both vehicles. 
(c) The "HUSBAND" agrees to pay to the "WIFE" 
_-i 
the sum of ONE THOCSA:m THO HUNDRED ($1,200.00) DOLLARS not 
- 16 - ') - I 
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1'1 
later than thirty (30) days after signing this Separation 
, ment, which amount represents one-half C'2) of the value of s;: 
vehicles. 
(d) Each party agrees to pay one-half (~) of. 
1 shipping costs pertaining to the transfer of the furniture be. 
shipped to "WIFE'S" new residence. 
17. CHANGE OF ADDRESS 
The parties hereby agree that each will notifi· 
the other by certified mail of any change of address, and/w 
" telephone number, within five (5) days of the date of such 
change. 
18. LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
(a) The parties respectively acknowledge tha: 
each has had the option to obtain independent legal advice b· 
counsel of her or his own selection; the "WIFE" has been 
, represented by MARVIN MALIN, ESQ. , 3 7 5 North Broadway, Jeric) 
New York 117 53, and the "HUSBAND" has refused legal represen: 
Simultaneously with the execution of this Separation Agreemer 
the "HUSBAND" w:i.11 pay to the "WIFE'S" attorney, one-half U,': 
.of his fee for this Separation Agreement, and upon such paylli 
the "WIFE" does hereby agree that she will forever save, hol: 
harmless and indemnify the "HUSBAND" on account of any clail 
may hereafter be asserted for legal services rendered on h~ 
behalf to the date hereof, of any kind or nature. 
(b) Nothing herein contained shall be deemei 
'' or construed as a waiver or denial of the "HIFE' S" right to 
.. ~ 
•) ·. 
- 17 - IN , 
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secure payment of counsel fees, as provided by law, for any 
'breach by the "HUSBAND" of the terms of this Separation Agreement. 
(c) In the event that either party brings an 
action for divorce, each party shall be responsible for his 
'own counsel fees. 
19. FULL DISCLOSURE 
The parties both acknowledge that this is a 
,fair Separation Agreement and is not the result of any fraud, 
duress or undue influence exercised by either party upon the 
~other or by any other person or persons upon either. 
20. MODIFICATION AND WAIVER 
Neither this Separation Agreement nor any pro-
vision thereof shall be amended or modified or deemed amended 
:i or modified, except by an Agreement in writing duly subscribed 
and acknowledged with the same formality as this Separation 
Agreement. Any waiver by either party of any provision of this 
.Separation Agreement or any right or option hereunder shall' 
not be deemed a continuing waiver and shall not prevent or 
estop such party from thereafter enforcing such provision, 
right or option, and the failure of either party to insist 
in any one or more instances upon the strict performance of any 
of the terms or provisions of this Separation Agreement by 
the other party shall not be construed as a waiver or re-
·" linquishment for the future of any such term or provisi_on, 
but the same shall continue in full force and effect. 
•J • 
~ ' 
- 18 -
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I 
21. LEGAL DiTERPRETATION 
All matters affecting the interpretation of :~ 
Separation Agreement and the rights of the parties hereto sh, 
, be governed by the laws of the State of New York. 
22. POSSIBLE EVALIDITY 
In ca3" any provision of this Separation Agree: 
should be held to be contrary to, or invalid, under the law 
, of any country, state or other jurisdiction, such illegalit:: 
or invalidity, shall not affect in any way any other provis:c· 
~ereof, all of which shall continue, nevertheless, in full 
1 force and effect in any country, state or jurisdiction in 1-:i.: 
' such provision is legal and valid. 
23. RECONCILIATIN AND MATRIMONIAL DECRH 
(a) This Separation Agreement shall not be 
invalidated or otherwise affected by a reconciliation betwe1: 
' the parties hereto, or a resumption of marital relations bee:; 
.them unless said reconciliation or said resumption be docim.e: 
by a written statement executed and acknowledged by the par: 
with respect to said reconciliation and resumption and, in 
addition, setting forth that they are cancelling this Separa: 
Agreement, and this Separation Agreement shall not be inval'.: 
or otherwise affected by any decree or judgment of separati 
or divorce made by any Court in any action which may present . 
.. ~ 
exist or may hereafter be instituted by either party against 
- 19 - "" 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
st 
:~1\ MAUN \ IA. .t.r LA..,. 
1£1 
other for a separation or divorce, and the obligations and 
covenants of this Separation Agreement shall survive any 
decree or judgment of separation or divorce and shall not merge 
therein, and this Separation Agreenent may be enforced in-
dependently of such decree or judgment. 
(b) Both parties agree, stipulate and consent 
that no judgment, order or decree in any action for divorce 
or separation, whether brought in the State of New York, or in 
any otter state or country having jurisdictin of the parties 
hereto, shall make any provision for alimony or affect the 
property rights of eifrer party inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Separation Agreement, but if any provision be made in 
any judgment, order or decree which is inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Separation Agreement, or imposes a different 
or greater obligation on either of the parties hereto than 
provided in this Separation Agreement, the provisions of this 
Separa:ion Agreement shall take precedence and shall be the 
primary obligation of both of the parties hereto. It is further 
agreed that upon the trial of any action which may hereafte~ 
be instituted by either of the parties against the other 
for an absolute divorce in any Court of competent jurisdiction, 
the party instituting such action shall read the provisions 
of this Separation Agreement relating to the custody, alimony 
and support into the record of such action as a stipulation 
between the parties as to the question of alimony and support, 
and the ccrstody of the issue of said marriage. Such party shall 
further request that the decree shall contain a provision 
- 20 -
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'· specifically reciting, in words or substance, "Said Agreemen· 
,, Separation is not merged in, but survives this decree, and t: 
parties thereof are hereby ordered to comply with it on its 
, terms at all times and places." 
24. INDEPENDENT COVENANTS 
Each of the respective rights and obligatioos 
of the parties hereunder shall be deemed independent and may 
enforced independently irrespective of any of the other right 
and obligations set forth herein. 
25. ENTIRE UNDERSTANDING 
This Separation Agreement contains the entire 
'I 
, understanding the parties who hereby acknowledge that there 
ij ' 
: have been and 
1: 
are no representations, warranties, covenants c: 
,, 
':undertaking other than those expressly set forth herein. Th: 
parties agree that a Memorandum of the Agreement shall be 
executed upon th~ signing hereof and that the same may be fil: 
i1~n the office of the Nassau County Clerk. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have 
hereunto set their respective hands and seals the day and yea: 
: first above written, and they hereby acknmvledge that the 
provisions of this Separation Agreement shall be bind:i.ng upon 
; their respective heirs, next-of-kin, executors and administra: \ .~ '~1. 
.• . . . . r· --/!,,,,_<;) .v ---
JANET R
10ST ' . 
~, //'Q//'_/ / --::%<~ c-:;_.; ___.; 
PAUL ROST 
I) NOR™ BROADWAY 
·~J'40. NEW YORK 11753 - 21 -
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STATE OF NEW YORK) 
) SS. : 
' COUNTY OF NASSAU ) 
v: 
~0.t.~NA,y 
'l':~I( I I 7$J 
On this /.G day of June, 1976, belfore me 
personally came JANET ROST, to me knocvn and known to me to be 
the individual described herein and who executed the foregoing 
instrument and she did duly acknowledge to me that she executed 
the same. 
STATE OF NEW YORK) 
) SS.: 
' COUNTY OF NASSAU ) 
,;/~ 
On this /S day of June, 1976 1 ·before me 
personally came PAUL ROST, to me known and known to me to be 
the individual described herein and who executed the foregoing 
. instrument and he did duly acknowledge to me that he executed 
same. 
.. 
- 22 - ,, . '
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SCHEDULE A 
The following credit union loan; are to be 
immediately paid off by both parties equally: 
1. Post Office Credit Union loan in then~ 
of JANET ROST. 
2. Reese Credit Union loan in the name of 
·,PAUL ROST. 
, All remaining obligations and debts for which the"WIFE" is 
!'es;ionsible are to be paid for immediately by the "HUSBAND", 
·.• 
·"' 
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SAMUEL KING 
KING & SCHUMACHER 
Attorney for Defendant 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
355-7493 
PETE N. VLAHOS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
62102464 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
PAUL F. ROST, * 
Plaintiff and * PETITION FOR INTERLOCUTORY 
Respondent, APPEAL AND FOR STAY OF 
* JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
vs. 
* 
JANET L. ROST, 
* Civil No. 15398 
Defendant and 
Appellant. * 
* * * 
ORDER COMPLAINED OF 
On August 31, 1977, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Weber 
County District Judge, entered a verbal order from the bench deny-
ing respondent's Motion for Abatement of Proceedings, and also 
denied appellant's alternative Motion for Continuance of Trial, 
ordered the trial to proceed on September 7, 1977, and released 
respondent from financial obligations to appellant and his chil-
dren which respondent had pursuant to his sworn Agreement of 
Separation dated June 15, 1976, although there was no pleading 
nor argument before the court concerning any determination of 
respondent's obligation under such agreement. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT 
1. That the court grant appellant an interlocutory appea: 
to determine the issues of whether the Utah court should either 
continue jurisdiction of this case or abate the Utah proceedina 
under appropriate terms. 
2. For an order pursuant to Rule 65 (A), 65 (B) (b) (2), 65 
(d) (5), URCP, on such terms as the court deems appropriate, bu: 
to which appellant prays that it be without notice, and thati: 
stay further proceedings in the District Court until the iss~ 
abatement has been determined. 
3. Setting aside and striking paragraph 6 of the Distric: 
Court's "Order on Defendant's Motion for Abatement and for 
Alternative Relief," if such is in the order signed by the C~ 
for the reason that it grants respondent relief from a Separat: 
Agreement obligation prior to trial and with no notice or hea:: 
to appellant of any such request for relief and it not havi~~ 
verbally argued to the court at the hearing on August 31, 191i. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Annexed are copies of the "Order Allowing Amendment of 
Complaint" and "Order on Defendant's Motion for Abatement and. 
Alternative Relief." Appellant does not know if these have be' 
entered in their form by the court as copies, not indicating 
signature, as proposed drafts were submitted by mail on Frida'' 
September 2, 1977, and the courthouse has been closed since. 
ANNEX 2, P 2 
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In chronological sequence, the facts are as follows: 
Prior to 1962 - Both parties born and raised in New York State. 
1962 - The parties marry in Brooklyn, New York· 
January 24, 1964 - Parties' son John born. 
May 17, 1966 - Parties' daughter Suzanne born. 
February, 1974 - Parties stop residing together, although there 
are brief attempts at reconciliation up to July, 1975. Appellant 
and children reside in New York. 
June 15, 1976 - Parties enter into Agreement of Separation which 
is prepared by an attorney suitable to both parties and filed of 
record in the New York Courts. In the event of divorce, parties 
agree to read its terms into divorce record, to comply with them 
and such terms to provide that Agreement is to interpreted subject 
to laws of New York. 
1974 - 1977 - Respondent, u. S. Air Force Officer on duty in Texas, 
California, Thailand, and present assignment at Hill Air Force 
Base, Utah. Designates Texas as his state of permanent residence. 
June 6, 1977 - Appellant served with Summons and Complaint in this 
case. Complaint concedes custody of children to appellant. 
Complaint also states that appellant "rescinds" the Agreement of 
Separation without stating cause therefor. 
June 21, 1977 - Appellant files action for divorce in the Supreme 
Court of the State of New York, County of Queens, annexing Separa-
tion Agreement and agreeing to abide by its terms. 
ANNEX 2, P 3. 
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June 24, 1977 - Appellant submits special appearance motion re-
questing that Utah Court exercise discretion to decline juris-
diction on basis that New York is the appropriate forum. 
July 11, 1977 - Without filing response to which appellant c~ 
plead, respondent appears ex parte before District Court and 9,. 
Order denying contest of jurisdiction by appellant. 
July 18, 1977 - Appellant submits Answer and Counterclaim and'· 
submits "Defendant's Plea in Abatement," which submits law and 
facts and requests Utah Court abate its proceedings without fil~ 
missing them, in favor of New York action. 
July 22, 1977 - Respondent files request for trial setting, ar 
fying that the case "is now at issue" although respondent has:. 
filed Renly to Counterclaim, there has been no opportunity for 
covery and plea in abatement is not ruled on. 
August 11, 1977 - Respondent files "Answer to Defendant's Pl~ 
[sic) Abatement." 
August 12, 1977 - Appellant sends children to Utah for first~ 
with appellant in two years. 
August 18, 1977 - Respondent served with Surr'Tlons and Complaint 
New York action. Constable advises that she believes responde: 
evaded service, as respondent refused to accept it at Hill Air 
Force Base and would not answer at his apartment in Ogden. 
August 19-26, 1977 - Respondent appears before court, ex parte. 
asks for both children's custody and for immediate trial. 
ANNEX 2, P 4. 
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August 28, 1977 - Ten year old daughter, Suzanne, retuned to New 
York via airplane by respondent. Thirteen year old son, John, 
remains with respondent, apparently at John's choice. 
August 29, 1977 - Appellant receives notice of trial setting for 
September 7, 1977. Custody to appellant is not in issue, appel-
lant's plea in abatement is pending, respondent has not filed Reply, 
discovery on both sides is being deferred until which state is to 
try case is determined. 
August 31, 1977 - By courtesy of respondent's counsel, appellant's 
counsel is heard on request for ruling on issue of abatement and, 
if Utah is to proceed with case, for time to prepare for trial. 
District Court denies Plea in Abatement. 
District Court enters Order raising custody as issue, but 
staying respondent from claiming appellant is "unfit." 
District Court enters Order terminating respondent's duties 
under Agreement of Separation as of September 7, 1977. Such has 
never been plead, argued, or submitted to the court. 
Respondent's Reply is filed. 
At hearing, appellant raises points that Plea in Abatement 
is proper, that there is no possibility in three remaining court 
days to take discovery, that now that respondent has raised issue 
of custody, it is necessary for a well-informed decision that 
witnesses concerning the parties and the children be allowed to 
appear, that custody evaluation is appropriate, that it is im-
possible for appellant to go to trial adequately prepared on 
September 7, 1977. 
ANNEX 2, P 5. 
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Trial court advises respondent to cooperate in discovery, 
Appellant argues that interrogatories and interrogatory answer; 
can't be prepared, served and considered, nor oral deposition 
transcribed before September 7, 1977, regardless of best effor: 
of either party. The court denies all re lief requested by app( 
lant except for allowing three court days of discovery. 
August 31, September 2, 19 77 - Appellant fails at efforts to se: 
even though, for purposes of settlement, appellant agrees to Cc 
jurisdiction and to $300 per month reduction of child support;: 
alimony from terms of Agreement of Separation. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant's Special Appearance to Contest Jurisdiction, 
while meritorious, was not as strong as her subsequent Plea in 
Abatement. 
In her pleadings, appellant conceded that the Utah court 
had jurisdiction because respondent had resided in Utah for m~ 
than 90 days which gave the court jurisdiction over respondent 
of the marriage, even though it lacked in personam jurisdict~ 
appellant and the parties' children. 
The law supports a court exercising its discretion to re: 
to accept jurisdiction in a proper case. 
While not exactly in point because it involved a "long-a: 
statute proceedings, Union Ski Company v. Union Plastics Co_!ES 
tion, 548 P2d 1257 (Utah, 1976), is of help. The case involve: 
"long-arm" filing in Utah, but where most of the parties and 
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activity were in California. In declining to exercise jurisdic-
tion, the Utah court held, 
.there is a further principle, recognized in this 
area of the law, which may be regarded as having some 
bearing on the trial court's determination here. That 
is, that it is generally thought to be more fair and 
logical to find jurisdiction in the forum state when 
the major aspects of the activity out of which the 
cause of action arises occurs in that state; and con-
versely, that determination of jurisdiction in the 
forum state is less likely to be found where the princi-
pal activities: (the execution of the contract, manu-
facture of the boots, and the payments therefor and 
defendant's alleged breach of the contract) take place 
elsewhere." 
As stated above, appellant felt that her Plea in Abatement 
had a stronger basis than her request that the court decline juris-
diction. 
The reason is that if a court declines jurisdiction, the 
case is dead before that court. A party might abuse this by then 
delaying proceedings in the other forum. 
If the court "abates" a local proceeding, it is then in a 
position to recommence proceedings whenever the interests of justice 
indicate, such as to avoid delay. 
A plea in abatement and order thereon is an appropriate 
procedural step. 
"The simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction over a case 
involving the same subject matter and the same parties 
by more than one court may be prevented by various pro-
cedural means. Ordinarily, a court will grant a plea 
in abatement or a request for a stay on the ground that 
a proceeding concerning the same case had been commenced 
in a court of concurrent jurisdiction." 20 ~' 2nd, 
Courts, §219. 
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Appellant urges that it is very important, where states. 
concurrent jurisdiction, that the first filing of a compla~t 
a matter of very small significance. What should be signific; 
is which state is actually the most appropriate forum based or. 
the facts. While divorce is sometimes necessary as a genera! 
matter, it should not be encouraged. To make the first fillnc 
a divorce complaint a significant factor in determining wh: 
of courts of concurrent jurisdiction should act, is to rewa~ 
party who rushes to the courthouse. Any policy of law that e:.· 
courages a speedy filing for divorce would be contrary to oth: 
more basic policies of law. 
Following is a listing of reasons on which the issue of 
abatement can be determined. 
FOR UTAH FOR NEW YORK 
1. Respondent stationed in Utah. 1. Parties born and rais~r 
2. Respondent filed for divorce York. 
first. 2. Appellant has resided in 
3. Thirteen year old son has York with children conti: 
been with respondent in Utah ously for last two years 
since August 12, 1977. before then on occasiooi 
4. The Utah District Court ing on respondent's stat: 
ordered trial in Utah. assignment. 
5. Respondent alleges the 13 3. The children resided in':. 
year old son wishes to stay York at the time the cas: 
permanently in Utah. started. 
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FOR NEW YORK 
4. Proper trial of an issue of custody 
requires submitting substantial 
information to the trial judge as 
to the fitness and qualifications 
of each parent, the character of 
the home the children have resided 
in, with testimony of people such 
as school teachers and neighbors 
being very valuable. No such wit-
nesses reside in Utah, but do in 
New York. 
5. Respondent can travel without ex-
pense by Military Air Transport 
Service. Appellant, children, and 
witnesses cannot. There is a high 
expense factor in delivering 
appropriate witnesses to Utah 
for trial on the issues of custody 
and whether the separation agree-
ment should be enforced. If these 
witnesses do not travel to Utah, 
the expense and attorney fees of 
taking their depositions in New 
York for use in Utah will still 
be extremely high. 
ANNEX 2, P 9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FOR NEW YORK 
6. Since separating from respondent, 
appellant and the children have he. 
rehabilitative help from mental he: 
experts in New York. Appellant ar 
each child has seen a different ps 
ciatrist. The testimony of theH 
professionals would be invaluab~· 
a proper determination of custody. 
All these professionals are in N5 
York. 
7. The Separation Agreement provi~s 
that it is to be interpreted accor: 
ing to New York law. It is both:. 
visable to have the Agreement inte: 
preted originally by New York cour: 
as to its enforcement or modifica:. 
and if the Agreement is upheld in· 
or in part, further interpretati~ 
it can best be made by New YodJr 
and lawyers. 
8. As respondent is a professional~ 
Force officer, it is entirely~~ 
that he will not remain in Ut~. 
has indicated that his state of F' 
manent residence is Texas. cases 
domestic law, and particularly th: 
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FOR NEW YORK 
involving child support or custody, 
frequently return to the court for 
further hearing or modification. The 
probability is extreme that neither 
party will reside in Utah for such 
modification, yet if Utah entered the 
primary decree, appellant will have 
no basis of bringing him before the 
New York courts unless he be there 
physically, which might involve trial 
in some third state, territory of 
the United States, or either a foreign 
country or no hearing at all, if 
respondent is on foreign assignment. 
(The Utah long-arm statute allows 
doemestic jurisdicition only for acts 
done by the absent party while in 
the jurisdiction. 78-27-24(6) UCA.) 
9. Only extraordinary reasons justify 
separation of children, granting custody 
of one child to one party and custody 
of the other child to the other party. 
Should respondent's claim for custody 
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FOR NEW YORK 
of the son be granted, this will 
the result. As New York is best 
suited to try the entire issue of 
custody, it can best determine t 
issue of avoidance of separating 
children from each other. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant recognizes that granting any of the relief sh 
seeks in this Petition will delay trial. There is a questioo 
to how this will effect their 13 year old boy who now, apparen 
wishes to reside with his father in Utah. Such delay may be 
sirable. Not having been with his father for the previous~ 
years, it really is too early to tell whether the boy has as 
permanent base for residing with his father away from his mo 
sister, known friends and schools. It is, for example, possib 
that his wish to stay with his father is primarily and express 
of his need for his father which has not been met. Time may 
be advisable to let this child work his relationships out. 
DATED September 6, 1977. 
SAMUEL KING 
ANNEX 2, P 12. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
